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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

OMA C. STRONG,
Plaintiff-Respondent/
CASE NO. 14182

-vsTED J. STRONG,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
TED J. STRONG

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to modify
a divorce decree.

Defendant subsequently moved to modify

the same divorce decree.

Both motions were heard on May 1,

1976.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT'
The Trial Court denied both the plaintiff's and the
defendant's motions to modify the divorce decree and awarded
judgment against the defendant in the amount of $1,450.00 for
delinquent child support plus $100 attorney's fees and costs
and ordered the defendant to commence alimony and child support
payments as per the divorce decree beginning May 1, 1975.

The

plaintiff was denied judgment for delinquent alimony payments.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-appellant, Ted J. STrong, seeks a reversal
of that part of the Judgment, Decree and Order entered on the
9th day of June, 1975, which requires the defendant to
commence alimony payment as of May 1, 1975 and which denies
the relief sought by the defendant to the effect that the
Release executed by the plaintiff and introduced in evidence
as Exhibit 2-D constituted a permanent release of defendant's
obligation to pay alimony to the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced by a Divorce Decree
entered on February 14, 1962.

In April of 1971, plaintiff

asked the defendant to advance her the sum of $2,000 to be
used as a down payment on a home in Sandy, Utah (R. 7,8).
Defendant testified that the plaintiff agreed to release him
from his alimony and child support for his daughter Carolyn
if he would give her the $2,000 (R. 35, 36). Plaintiff then
presented a Stipulation in Support of Motion to Modify Decree
of Divorce (Exhibit 1-D) providing, among other things, that
in exchange for the $2,000, defendant would only have to pay
$50 per month child support and $50 per month alimony for a
period of two years instead of $150 per month child support
and $50 per month alimony (R. 36). Defendant refused to sign
said Stipulation because it did not reflect the terms of the
initial agreement (R. 36). Plaintiff then wrote and executed
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a document (Exhibit 2-D) stating:
"To Whom It May Concern:
"I do hereby agree to relinquish my alimony
payments and child support of one child, (Carolyn
Strong) for the sum of $1,000.00 each, respectively."
(R. 18, 36).
After receiving Exhibit 2-D, defendant delivered a check for
$2,000 to plaintiff (R. 36). Plaintiff endorsed the check
(R. 19).
The defendant testified directly and unequivocally
concerning the agreement between the parties.

He stated em-

phatically that he refused to sign the plaintiff's Stipulation
(Exhibit 1) (R. 36). The plaintiff's testimony concerning the
same agreement was vague and uncertain.

She did not remember

the Stipulation (Exhibit 1), but did remember signing the
Release of future alimony payments (Exhibit 2)(R. 18).
During the period of time between the delivery of the
$2,000 and the filing of this Motion to Modify Decree,
approximately four years, the plaintiff made no request that
defendant make any alimony or support payments (R. 36).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AN UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF FUTURE ALIMONY PAYMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION IS BINDING ON THE PARTIES.
Although the Utah cases cast substantial doubt upon the
rights of parents to agree between themselves as to their
obligations concerning future payments of support money for

minor children, there is no similar doubt with respect to the
rights of the parties to come to an agreement with respect to
payments due for alimony.

In Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Ut. 574,

144 P. (2d) 528, the Court discussed the proposition that a
decree for the payment of alimony operates as a judgment lien
as to all past due and unpaid installments.

The Court stated

that the rule would be applicable "absent any competent facts
to establish release, satisfaction, offsets, estoppel or other
bases for reducing the amount for which execution should issue."
(Emphasis supplied).

Pac. Rep. 530.

In Wallis v. Wallis (1958)

9 Ut(2d) 237, 342 P.(2d) 103, Justice McDonough stated for
the court:
"The power of the parties to make agreements
changing the monetary terms of a divorce decree
is generally upheld except where future child
support is concerned, absent hardship, fraud,
duress, concealment, undue influence or mutual
mistake."
The Court cited the following cases:

McKinney v. McKinney, 152

Kan. 372, 103 P.2d 793; Hill v. Hill, 103 Colo. 492, 107 P.2d.
597; Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, 286 N.Y. 21, 38 N.E. 2d. 114;
Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296, 26 NE 2d. 265; Apfelbaum.
v. Apfelbaum, 111 N. J. Eq. 529, 162 A.543, 84 ALR 298;
Higgins v. Higgins, Sup., 119 N.Y.S.2d 103; Cavenaugh v.
Cavenaugh, 106 111. App. 209.

Thus it appears that Utah

follows the general rule insofar as alimony obligations are
concerned, namely, that the parties themselves can come to
an agreement in the nature of a release.
There is no claim in the instant case, nor is there any

basis for a claim in the nature of hardship, fraud, duress,
concealment, undue influence or mutual mistake.
Appellant respectfully suggests that the special rule
applicable to agreements concerning future child support is
not applicable to releases for future alimony payments.

The

same public policy questions are not applicable to alimony as
to child support.

It is well settled, for example, that if

a divorced woman remarries, the obligation of the former husband
to pay alimony ceases.

The obligation of a father to support

his minor child continues, however, regardless of such a
remarriage.
There is no legal or public policy consideration which
prevents a wife from releasing a former husband's obligation
to make future alimony payments and the Court should determine
that in the instant case, insofar as plaintiff's claim to
alimony is concerned, the unconditional release received in
evidence as Exhibit D-2 binds the plaintiff in accordance
with its terms.
POINT II.
IT IS CLEAR FROM THE TRIAL RECORD THAT THE PARTIES'
INTENTION WAS TO BE BOUND BY THE UNCONDITIONAL
RELEASE OF FUTURE ALIMONY PAYMENTS.
A brief review of the communications between plaintiff
and defendant and their actions prior and subsequent to the
execution of the Release identified as Exhibit 2-D clearly
demonstrates that both the plaintiff and the defendant understood the terms of the Release, voluntarily entered into the

agreement and fully intended to be bound by the terms of the
Release.
Sometime in 1971, the plaintiff approached the defendant
with a proposal whereunder the defendant would advance the
plaintiff the sum of $2,000 to be used as a down payment on a
house, and in consideration therefor the plaintiff would unconditionally release the defendant from his obligation to pay
alimony to the plaintiff and child support for Carolyn Strong
(R. 7, 8, 35, 36). The defendant agreed to the terms of the
proposal (R. 35, 36). Thereafter, plaintiff presented the
defendant a Stipulation in Support of Motion to Modify Decree
of Divorce (Exhibit 1-D) which contained substantially different
terms than the initial agreement (R. 36). The Stipulation
provided that the defendant would pay the plaintiff $2,000
cash to be used as a down payment on a home and would also
pay all dental bills of the three children in custody of the
plaintiff.

In exchange for these payments the defendant would

be released from child support payments in the amount of $100
per month for two years.

Thus, in exchange for a Release

from $25 00 of child support, defendant would have had to secure
a loan in the amount of $2,000, pay interest on the money
borrowed and additionally pay all dental bills for three children.
The defendant refused to sign the Stipulation because its terms
were opposite those agreed to previously (R. 36). Plaintiff
then wrote and executed the Release identified as Exhibit 2-D
which stated that for $1,000 the plaintiff would unconditionally
relinquish her alimony payments from defendant and for another
$1,000 she would unconditionally relinquish child support for
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Carolyn.

Plaintiff signed the Release and gave it to defendant

in exchange for $2f000 (R. 36).
It appears that the parties initially entered into a
verbal agreement.

The plaintiff later attempted to change

the terms of the agreement by presenting the Stipulation
(Exhibit 1-D) to defendant for signature.
lation was never executed.

However, the Stipu-

The plaintiff then drafted and

executed a Release (Exhibit 2-D). She drafted or typed the
document so she was familiar with its contents (R. 36). The
Release, which by its terms was an unconditional release, was
then voluntarily exchanged for the $2,000.

At that point

in time there was a meeting of the minds of the parties.
Both parties understood the terms of the agreement and both
parties performed their part of the agreement.

For the next

four years the parties indicated by their actions that they
were bound by the Release.

The plaintiff made no requests for

alimony or child support payments (R. 36), even though she
testified that she had incurred substantial debt during that
period (R. 9, 10, 11). The defendant remarried in reliance
upon the Release incurring additional financial responsibilities.
(Defendant's Affidavit dated March 28, 1975).

Both the plaintiff

and defendant performed the terms of the agreement from 1971
to 1975 and should continue to do so.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff and defendant knowingly and voluntarily
entered into an agreement whereby the defendant would pay to

the plaintiff the sum of $2,000 in exchange for an unconditional
release from his obligation to pay alimony to plaintiff and child
support for the parties1 daughter, Carolyn.
portion of the agreement is not at issue.
made concerning future alimony.

The child support
The agreement was

The defendant has performed

his part of the agreement; the plaintiff has received the
benefit of the agreement.

The defendant has remarried and

incurred increased financial responsibilities in reliance upon
the agreement, and the parties should be bound by the agreement.
Furthermore, the Utah courts have recognized the right of a
spouse to release the other spouse from alimony payments.
It is respectfully submitted that the agreement between
the parties was entered into fairly and voluntarily, is not
against public policy, and should be enforced releasing,
defendant from all future alimony payments to the plaintiff.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ? ^ day of September, 1975.
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